Are we human because of unique traits
and attributes not shared with
either animal or machine? The
definition of "human"
is circular: we are human by virtue
of the properties that make us
human (i.e., distinct from animal
and machine). It is a definition
by negation: that which separates
us from animal and machine is
our "human-ness".
We are human because we are
not animal, nor machine. But
such thinking has been rendered
progressively less tenable by
the advent of evolutionary and
neo-evolutionary theories which
postulate a continuum in nature
between animals and Man.
Our uniqueness is partly quantitative
and partly qualitative. Many
animals are capable of cognitively
manipulating symbols and using
tools. Few are as adept at it
as we are. These are easily
quantifiable differences - two
of many.
Qualitative differences are
a lot more difficult to substantiate.
In the absence of privileged
access to the animal mind, we
cannot and don't know if animals
feel guilt, for instance. Do
animals love? Do they have a
concept of sin? What about object
permanence, meaning, reasoning,
self-awareness, critical thinking?
Individuality? Emotions? Empathy?
Is artificial intelligence (AI)
an oxymoron? A machine that
passes the Turing Test may well
be described as "human".
But is it really? And if it
is not - why isn't it?
Literature is full of stories
of monsters - Frankenstein,
the Golem - and androids or
anthropoids. Their behaviour
is more "humane" than
the humans around them. This,
perhaps, is what really sets
humans apart: their behavioural
unpredictability. It is yielded
by the interaction between Mankind's
underlying immutable genetically-determined
nature - and Man's kaleidoscopically
changing environments.
The Constructivists even claim
that Human Nature is a mere
cultural artefact. Sociobiologists,
on the other hand, are determinists.
They believe that human nature
- being the inevitable and inexorable
outcome of our bestial ancestry
- cannot be the subject of moral
judgment.
An improved Turing Test would
look for baffling and erratic
patterns of misbehaviour to
identify humans. Pico della
Mirandola wrote in "Oration
on the Dignity of Man"
that Man was born without a
form and can mould and transform
- actually, create - himself
at will. Existence precedes
essence, said the Existentialists
centuries later.
The one defining human characteristic
may be our awareness of our
mortality. The automatically
triggered, "fight or flight",
battle for survival is common
to all living things (and to
appropriately programmed machines).
Not so the catalytic effects
of imminent death. These are
uniquely human. The appreciation
of the fleeting translates into
aesthetics, the uniqueness of
our ephemeral life breeds morality,
and the scarcity of time gives
rise to ambition and creativity.
In an infinite life, everything
materializes at one time or
another, so the concept of choice
is spurious. The realization
of our finiteness forces us
to choose among alternatives.
This act of selection is predicated
upon the existence of "free
will". Animals and machines
are thought to be devoid of
choice, slaves to their genetic
or human programming.
Yet, all these answers to the
question: "What does it
mean to be human" - are
lacking.
The set of attributes we designate
as human is subject to profound
alteration. Drugs, neuroscience,
introspection, and experience
all cause irreversible changes
in these traits and characteristics.
The accumulation of these changes
can lead, in principle, to the
emergence of new properties,
or to the abolition of old ones.
Animals and machines are not
supposed to possess free will
or exercise it. What, then,
about fusions of machines and
humans (bionics)? At which point
does a human turn into a machine?
And why should we assume that
free will ceases to exist at
that - rather arbitrary - point?
Introspection - the ability
to construct self-referential
and recursive models of the
world - is supposed to be a
uniquely human quality. What
about introspective machines?
Surely, say the critics, such
machines are PROGRAMMED to introspect,
as opposed to humans. To qualify
as introspection, it must be
WILLED, they continue. Yet,
if introspection is willed -
WHO wills it? Self-willed introspection
leads to infinite regression
and formal logical paradoxes.
Moreover, the notion - if not
the formal concept - of "human"
rests on many hidden assumptions
and conventions.
Political correctness notwithstanding
- why presume that men and women
(or different races) are identically
human? Aristotle thought they
were not. A lot separates males
from females - genetically (both
genotype and phenotype) and
environmentally (culturally).
What is common to these two
sub-species that makes them
both "human"?
Can we conceive of a human
without body (i.e., a Platonian
Form, or soul)? Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas think not. A
soul has no existence separate
from the body. A machine-supported
energy field with mental states
similar to ours today - would
it be considered human? What
about someone in a state of
coma - is he or she (or it)
fully human?
Is a new born baby human -
or, at least, fully human -
and, if so, in which sense?
What about a future human race
- whose features would be unrecognizable
to us? Machine-based intelligence
- would it be thought of as
human? If yes, when would it
be considered human?
In all these deliberations,
we may be confusing "human"
with "person". The
former is a private case of
the latter. Locke's person is
a moral agent, a being responsible
for its actions. It is constituted
by the continuity of its mental
states accessible to introspection.
Locke's is a functional definition.
It readily accommodates non-human
persons (machines, energy matrices)
if the functional conditions
are satisfied. Thus, an android
which meets the prescribed requirements
is more human than a brain dead
person.
Descartes' objection that one
cannot specify conditions of
singularity and identity over
time for disembodied souls is
right only if we assume that
such "souls" possess
no energy. A bodiless intelligent
energy matrix which maintains
its form and identity over time
is conceivable. Certain AI and
genetic software programs already
do it.
Strawson is Cartesian and Kantian
in his definition of a "person"
as a "primitive".
Both the corporeal predicates
and those pertaining to mental
states apply equally, simultaneously,
and inseparably to all the individuals
of that type of entity. Human
beings are one such entity.
Some, like Wiggins, limit the
list of possible persons to
animals - but this is far from
rigorously necessary and is
unduly restrictive.
The truth is probably in a
synthesis:
A person is any type of fundamental
and irreducible entity whose
typical physical individuals
(i.e., members) are capable
of continuously experiencing
a range of states of consciousness
and permanently having a list
of psychological attributes.
This definition allows for
non-animal persons and recognizes
the personhood of a brain damaged
human ("capable of experiencing").
It also incorporates Locke's
view of humans as possessing
an ontological status similar
to "clubs" or "nations"
- their personal identity consists
of a variety of interconnected
psychological continuities.
About The Author
Sam Vaknin is the author of
Malignant Self Love - Narcissism
Revisited and After the Rain
- How the West Lost the East.
He is a columnist for Central
Europe Review, PopMatters, and
eBookWeb , a United Press International
(UPI) Senior Business Correspondent,
and the editor of mental health
and Central East Europe categories
in The Open Directory Bellaonline,
and Suite101 .
Until recently, he served as
the Economic Advisor to the
Government of Macedonia.
